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1. Introduction 
Adopting the Lorenz curve as a basis for judging the inequality exhibited by income distributions is in 
line with common practice in applied economics. The strategy for achieving rankings of Lorenz curves 
by the extent of inequality depends on whether or not the Lorenz curves intersect. In the case of non-
intersecting Lorenz curves the higher of the Lorenz curves (first-degree Lorenz dominance) is 
recognized as the one with lowest inequality. The normative justification of this practice relies on the 
Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which states that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer 
individual reduces income inequality, provided that their ranks in the income distribution are 
unchanged. However, when Lorenz curves intersect a weaker ordering criterion than first-degree 
Lorenz dominance is called for. To this end it is natural to use either second-degree upward or 
downward Lorenz dominance, i.e. integrating the Lorenz curves from below or above. Mehran (1976) 
provided a normative justification of second-degree upward Lorenz dominance by demonstrating that 
an alternative version of Kolm’s (1976) principle of diminishing transfers is consistent with second-
degree upward Lorenz dominance. The major difference between Kolm’s principle of diminishing 
transfers and Mehran’s principle of positional transfer sensitivity
1
 is that the former accounts for the 
difference in incomes between donors and receivers of income transfers, whereas the latter accounts 
for the difference in the proportion of individuals between donors and receivers. 
 In order to make clearer the normative properties of the criterion of second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance beyond its transfer sensitivity properties Zoli (1997, 2002) and Aaberge 
(2000b) introduced the (downside) mean-Gini-preserving transformation, which is a combination of 
progressive and regressive transfers that leaves the Gini coefficient unchanged. By applying a 
sequence of (downside) mean-Gini-preserving transformations a Lorenz curve L1 that second-degree 
upward dominates a Lorenz curve L2 can be obtained from L2, provided that L1 and L2 have equal Gini 
coefficients. Thus, the (downside) mean-Gini-preserving transformations transfer inequality from the 
lower to the higher parts of the Lorenz curve. However, as observed by Aaberge (2000b) a social 
decision-maker who supports the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers may alternatively prefer to use a 
sequence of transformations that transfer inequality from the higher to the lower parts of the income 
distribution. This property is captured by an upside version of the (downside) mean-Gini-preserving 
transformation, where the regressive transfer occurs lower down in the income distribution than the 
progressive transfer. Applying the upside mean-Gini-preserving transformation is demonstrated to be 
consistent with using the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. 
                                                     
1 See also Zoli (1999). 
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 To judge the normative significance of upward and downward Lorenz dominance of 
higher degrees than two this paper introduces and justifies the use of various more strict mean-spread-
preserving transformations than the mean-Gini-preserving transformation. 
 As will be demonstrated in Sections 2 and 3, second-degree Lorenz dominance forms a 
natural basis for the construction of two separate hierarchical sequences of partial orderings 
(dominance criteria), where one sequence places emphasize on changes that occur in the lower part of 
the Lorenz curve whereas the other places emphasize on changes that occur in the upper part of the 
Lorenz curve. The hierarchical and nested structure of the dominance criteria appears to be useful in 
empirical applications since we are allowed to identify the lowest degree of dominance required to 
reach unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves. As the dominance criteria of each sequence are nested 
these strategies also allow us to identify the value judgments that are needed to reach an unambiguous 
ranking of Lorenz curves. To this end, appropriate mean-spread-preserving transformations, which can 
be considered as generalizations of the mean-Gini-preserving transformation, have been introduced. 
Moreover, Section 3 demonstrates that the two hierarchical sequences of Lorenz dominance criteria 
divide the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality into two corresponding hierarchical 
systems of nested subfamilies that offer two different inequality aversion profiles; one exhibits 
successively higher degrees of downside inequality aversion whereas the other exhibits successively 
higher degrees of upside inequality aversion. Since the criteria of Lorenz dominance provide 
convenient computational methods, these results can be used to identify the largest subfamily of the 
family of rank-dependent measures of inequality and thus the least restrictive social preferences 
required to reach unambiguous ranking of any given set of Lorenz curves. Section 4 uses these 
characterization results to arrange the members of two different generalized Gini families of inequality 
measures into subfamilies according to their relationship to Lorenz dominance of various degrees. 
Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of the paper and briefly discusses the use of the obtained results 
as a basis for deriving dominance criteria for generalized Lorenz curves. 
2. Lorenz dominance and mean-Gini-preserving transformations 
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean µ is defined by 
(1) L u F t dt u
u
( ) ( ) , ,= ≤ ≤∫
−
1
0 1
0
1
µ
  
where { }1F (t) inf x : F(x) t− = ≥  is the left inverse of F. Thus, the Lorenz curve L(u) shows the share of 
total income received by the poorest 100 u per cent of the population. Note that F can either be a 
5 
discrete or a continuous distribution function. Although the former is what we actually observe, the 
latter often allows simpler derivation of theoretical results and is a valid large sample approximation. 
Thus, in most cases below F will be assumed to be a continuous distribution function, but the 
assumption of a discrete distribution function will be used where appropriate. 
 Under the restriction of equal mean incomes the problem of ranking Lorenz curves 
formally corresponds to the problem of choosing between uncertain prospects. This relationship has 
been utilized by e.g. Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) to characterize the criterion of non-intersecting 
Lorenz curves in the case of distributions with equal mean incomes. This was motivated by the fact 
that in cases of equal mean incomes the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is equivalent to 
second-degree stochastic dominance
2
, which means that the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz 
curves obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers states 
that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer individual reduces income inequality, provided that 
their ranks in the income distribution are unchanged, and is defined formally by
3
 
 
 DEFINITION 2.1. (The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.) Consider a discrete 
income distribution F. A transfer δ from a person with income ( )−1F t  to a person with income 
( )−1F s , where the transfer is assumed to be rank-preserving, is said to reduce inequality in F when 
<s t  and raise inequality in F when >s t . The former transfer will be denoted a Pigou-Dalton 
progressive transfer and the latter transfer a Pigou-Dalton regressive transfer. 
 
To perform inequality comparisons with Lorenz curves we can deal with distributions with equal 
means, or alternatively simply abandon the assumption of equal means and consider distributions of 
relative incomes.
4
 The latter approach normally forms the basis of empirical studies. 
 The standard criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves, called first-degree Lorenz 
dominance, is based on the following definition
5
.   
 
                                                     
2 For a proof see Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1934). 
3 Note that this definition of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers was proposed by Fields and Fei (1978). 
4 The importance of focusing on relative incomes was acknowledged already by Plato who proposed that the ratio of the top 
income to the bottom should be less than four to one (see Cowell, (1977)). See also Sen's (1992) discussion of relative 
deprivation and Smith's (1979) discussion of necessities. 
5 Note that most analyses of Lorenz dominance apply a definition that excludes the requirement of strict inequality for some 
u. 
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 DEFINITION 2.2. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to first-degree dominate a Lorenz curve L2 if 
 [ ]( ) ( ) ,1 2L u L u for all u 0 1≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for some , .u 0 1∈  
 
 In order to examine the relationship between various Lorenz dominance criteria and the 
measurement of inequality we will rely on the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality
6
 
defined by 
(2) 
1 1
1
P
0 0
1
J (L) 1 P (u)dL(u) 1 P (u)F (u)du
−′ ′= − = −
µ∫ ∫
  
where L is the Lorenz curve of the income distribution F with mean µ and the weight-function P′  is 
the derivative of a continuous, differentiable and concave function P defined on the unit interval where 
P(0) 0=  and P(1) 1= . To ensure that JP has the unit interval as its range the condition P (1) 0′ =  is 
imposed on P. As demonstrated by Yaari (1987,1988) and Aaberge (2001) the JP-family represents a 
preference relation defined either on the class of distribution functions (F) or on the class of Lorenz 
curves (L), where P can be interpreted as a preference function of a social decision-maker. The 
preference function P assigns weights to the incomes of the individuals in accordance with their rank 
in the income distribution. Therefore, the functional form of P reveals the attitude towards inequality 
of a social decision-maker who employs JP to judge between Lorenz curves. The most well-known 
member of the JP-family is the Gini coefficient, which is defined by 
(3) ( )
1 1
1
0 0
2
G(L) 1 2 L(u)du 1 1 u F (u)du
−
= − = − −
µ
∫ ∫ .  
 As demonstrated by Yaari (1988), the JP-family of inequality measures can be used as a 
basis for characterizing first-degree Lorenz dominance. For the sake of completeness the 
characterization result of first-degree Lorenz dominance given by Yaari (1988) is reproduced in 
Theorem 2.1 below, where L denotes the family of Lorenz curves and P1 is a class of preference 
functions defined by 
                                                     
6 Mehran (1976) introduced the JP-family by relying on descriptive arguments. A slightly different version of JP was 
introduced by Piesch (1975), whereas Giaccardi (1950) considered a discrete version of JP. For alternative normative 
motivations of the JP-family and various subfamilies of the JP-family we refer to Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), 
Weymark (1981), Yaari (1987, 1988), Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994), Aaberge (2001) and Gajdos (2002). 
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 [ ]{ }P1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0= ′ ′′ ′ > ′′ < ∈ ′ =P P and P are continuous on P t and P t for t and P: , , ( ) ( ) , , ( ) . 
 
 THEOREM 2.1. (Fields and Fei (1978) and Yaari (1988)). Let L1 and L2 be members of L. 
Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 first-degree dominates L2 
(ii) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers 
(iii) L2 can be obtained from L1 by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton regressive transfers 
(iv) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  for all 1P∈P  
 
 We refer to Fields and Fei (1978) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii) (and 
(iii))
7
 and to Yaari (1988) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (iv). 
 Atkinson (1970) defined inequality aversion as equivalent to risk aversion in the theory of 
choice under uncertainty. This was motivated by the fact that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is 
identical to the principle of mean-preserving spread introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), which is 
equivalent to the condition of dominating non-intersecting Lorenz curves. Thus, we adopt the following 
definition. 
 
 DEFINITION 2.3. A social decision-maker that supports the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers is said to exhibit inequality aversion. 
 
 A social decision-maker who prefers the dominating one of non-intersecting Lorenz 
curves favors transfers of incomes which reduce the differences between the income shares of the 
donor and the recipient, and is therefore said to be inequality averse.  
 The characterization of the condition of first-degree Lorenz dominance provided by 
Theorem 2.1 shows that non-intersecting Lorenz curves can be ordered without specifying further the 
functional form of the preference function P other than P being strictly concave. This means that JP 
satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers for concave P-functions. To deal with situations where 
Lorenz curves intersect a weaker principle than first-degree Lorenz dominance is called for. To this 
end we may employ second-degree upward Lorenz dominance defined by 
 
                                                     
7 See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) for a proof of the equivalence between (i), (ii) and (iii) in the case where the rank-
preserving condition is abandoned in the definition of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. 
8 
 DEFINITION 2.4A. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree upward dominate a Lorenz 
curve L2  if  
 [ ]
0
u
1
0
u
2
L (t) dt L (t) dt for all u 0,1∫ ∫≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1∈ . 
 
 The term upward dominance refers to the fact that the Lorenz curves are aggregated from 
below
8
. The aggregated Lorenz curve can be considered as a sum of weighted income shares, where 
the weights decrease linearly with increasing rank of the income receiver in the income distribution. 
Thus, a social decision-maker who prefers the second-degree upward dominating of two intersecting 
Lorenz curves pays more attention to inequality in the lower than in the upper part of the income 
distribution. An alternative ranking criterion to second-degree upward Lorenz dominance can be 
obtained by aggregating the Lorenz curve from above.  
 
 DEFINITION 2.4B. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree downward dominate a 
Lorenz curve L2  if  
 ( ) ( ) [ ]
1 1
2 1
u u
1- L (t) dt 1 - L (t) dt for all u 0,1≥ ∈∫ ∫  
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1∈ . 
 
 Note that second-degree downward as well as upward Lorenz dominance preserves first-
degree Lorenz dominance since first-degree Lorenz dominance implies second-degree upward as well 
as second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. Consequently, both dominance criteria are consistent 
with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. The choice between second-degree upward and 
downward Lorenz dominance clarifies whether or not equalizing transfers between poorer individuals 
should be considered more important than those between richer individuals. A social decision-maker 
who favors second-degree upward Lorenz dominance would most likely prefer third-degree upward 
Lorenz dominance to third-degree downward Lorenz dominance, because third-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance places the emphasis on equalizing transfers between poorer individuals, whereas third-
                                                     
8 Note that second-degree upward Lorenz dominance is equivalent to a normalized version of third-degree inverse stochastic 
dominance introduced by Muliere and Scarsini (1989). 
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degree downward Lorenz dominance places the emphasis on equalizing transfers between richer 
individuals. 
 As recognized by Muliere and Scarsini (1989) there is no simple relationship between 
third-degree stochastic dominance and second-degree upward Lorenz dominance, but that second-
degree upward Lorenz dominance is equivalent to third-degree upward inverse stochastic dominance. 
Thus, a general characterization of second-degree Lorenz dominance or third-degree inverse stochastic 
dominance in terms of ordering conditions for the utilitarian measures introduced by Kolm (1969) and 
Atkinson (1970) cannot be obtained. As explained in Section 1 the family of rank-dependent measures 
of inequality (defined by (2)) appears to form a more convenient basis for judging the normative 
significance of second-degree and higher degrees of Lorenz dominance than the utilitarian families 
introduced by Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970). 
 To judge the normative significance of criteria for ranking intersecting Lorenz curves, 
more powerful principles than the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers are needed. To this end Kolm 
(1976a,b) introduced the principle of diminishing transfers
9
, which for a fixed difference in income 
considers a transfer from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the further down in the 
income distribution it takes place.
10
 As indicated by Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Muliere and 
Scarsini (1989) the principle of diminishing transfers is, however, not consistent with second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance. Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of the principle of 
diminishing transfers by accounting for the difference in the proportion of individuals between donors 
and receivers of the income transfers rather than for the difference in income. The principle introduced 
by Mehran (1976) proves to characterize second-degree upward Lorenz dominance. To provide a 
formal definition of this principle, called the principle of positional transfer sensitivity by Zoli (1999), 
let I be an inequality measure and let ∆Ιt(δ,h) denote the change in I resulting from a transfer δ from a 
person with income 1F (t h)− +  to a person with income 1F (t)−  that leaves their ranks in the income 
distribution F unchanged, where F is assumed to be a discrete distribution for a finite population. 
Thus, ( )
t
I ,h∆ δ  is a negative number
11
. Furthermore, let ( )1 s,tI ,h∆ δ  be defined by 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( )1 s,t t sI ,h I ,h I ,h∆ δ = ∆ δ − ∆ δ .  
As will become evident later it will be convenient to denote Mehran’s principle of transfers the 
principle of first-degree downside positional transfer sensitivity. 
                                                     
9 Denoted aversion to downside inequality by Davis and Hoy (1994, 1995). 
10 For a formal definition, see Kolm (1976a,b). 
11 For convenience the dependence of I on F is suppressed in the notation for I.  
10 
 DEFINITION 2.5A. Consider a discrete income distribution F and rank-preserving 
transfers δ  from individuals with ranks s h+  and t h+  to individuals with ranks s and t in F. Then 
the inequality measure I is said to satisfy the principle of first-degree downside positional transfer 
sensitivity (first-degree DPTS) if 
 ( )
,
,
1 s t
I h 0 when s t∆ δ > < . 
 
 Mehran (1976) demonstrated that JP defined by (2) satisfies the principle of first-degree 
positional transfer sensitivity if and only if P (t) 0′′′ > 12. Moreover, as stated in Theorem 2.2A below 
dominance for all JP that satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principle of first-degree 
downside positional transfer sensitivity proves to be equivalent to the condition of second-degree upward 
Lorenz dominance. 
 The condition of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance proves to be equivalent to 
the condition that P (t) 0′′′ < , when JP for 1P∈P  is used as a ranking criterion for Lorenz curves. A 
social decision-maker who employs JP with P (t) 0′′′ <  considers a given transfer of money from a 
richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the higher it occurs in the income distribution, 
provided that the proportions of the population located between the receivers and the donors are equal. 
A formal definition of this principle, that we will call the principle of first-degree upside positional 
transfer sensitivity (first-degree UPTS), is given by 
 
 DEFINITION 2.5B. Consider a discrete distribution F and rank-preserving transfers δ 
from individuals with ranks +s h  and +t h  to individuals with ranks s and t in F. Then the inequality 
measure I is said to satisfy the principle of first-degree upside positional transfer sensitivity (first-
degree UPTS) if 
 ( )
,
,
1 s t
I h 0 when s t∆ δ < < . 
 
 Let *
12
P  be a family of preference functions related to JP and defined by 
 [ ]{ }*12 1P : P , P is continuous on 0,1 and P (t) 0 for t 0,1′′′ ′′′= ∈ > ∈P P . 
                                                     
12 Aaberge (2000a) demonstrated that JP defined by (2) satisfies Kolm's principle of diminishing transfers under conditions 
that depend on the shape of the preference function P as well as on the shape of the income distribution F. 
11 
 The following result provides a characterization of second-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance.
13
 
 
 THEOREM 2.2A. Let L1 and L2  be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 second-degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( ) *P 1 P 2 12J L J L for all P< ∈P  
(iii) ( ) ( )<P 1 P 2J L J L  for all ∈ 1P P  being such that JP obeys the principle of first-degree DPTS. 
 
(Proof in Appendix). 
 
 To ensure equivalence between second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and JP-
measures as decision criteria, Theorem 2.2A shows that it is necessary to restrict the preference 
functions P to be concave with positive third derivatives. If, by contrast, P has negative third 
derivative, then Theorem 2.2B yields the downward dominance analogy to Theorem 2.2A. 
 Let *
22
P  be a family of preference functions related to JP and defined by 
 [ ]{ }*22 1P : P , P is continuous on 0,1 and P (t) 0 for t 0,1′′′ ′′′= ∈ < ∈P P . 
 
 THEOREM 2.2B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 second-degree downward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( ) *P 1 P 2 22J L J L for all P< ∈P  
(iii) ( ) ( )<P 1 P 2J L J L  for all ∈ 1P P  being such that JP obeys the principle of first-degree UPTS. 
 
(Proof in Appendix). 
 
 REMARK. It follows from the proofs of Theorem 2.2A and 2.2B that the condition 
P (t) 0′′ <  for all t 0,1∈  can be relaxed and replaced by the conditions P (1) 0′′ ≤  and P (0) 0′′ ≤ , 
respectively. Moreover, note that the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 2.2A means that 
                                                     
13 Note that a slightly different version of the equivalence between (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2.2A is proved by Zoli (1999). 
Actually, when we restrict to cases of equal means Proposition 2 of Zoli (1999) and Theorem 2.2 yield identical results.  
12 
any JP with P (t) 0′′′ >  obeys the first-degree DPTS.
14
 A similar remark can be made for Theorem 2.2B. 
Thus, any JP with P (t) 0′′′ <  obeys the first-degree UPTS. However, the relevance of using measures 
of inequality that do not obey the Pigou-Dalton of transfers ( )P (t) 0′′ >  may be questioned. 
 
 An inequality averse social decision-maker that supports the criterion of second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance will act in line with the principle of first-degree DPTS and assign more 
weight to changes that take place in the lower part of the Lorenz curve than to changes that occur in 
the upper part of the Lorenz curve. By contrast, the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance emphasizes changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve. Thus, an inequality 
averse social decision-maker that employs the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance acts in favor of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principle of first-degree 
UPTS. To characterize social preferences of these types we adopt the following definition. 
 
 DEFINITION 2.6. An inequality averse social decision-maker that supports the Pigou-
Dalton principle of transfers and the principle of first-degree DPTS (UPTS) is said to exhibit 
downside (upside) inequality aversion of first-degree. 
 
 Theorems 2.2A and 2.2B demonstrate that the principles of upward and downward 
Lorenz dominance can be used to divide JP-measures into wide families of inequality measures that 
differ in the measures' sensitivity to changes (transfers) in the lower or upper part of the Lorenz curve. 
Members of the family { }*P 12J :P∈P  give more weight to changes that take place lower down in the 
Lorenz curve, whereas members of the family { }*P 22J :P∈P  give more weight to changes higher up in 
the Lorenz curve. Note that P t t t( )= −2 2 , the P-function that corresponds to the Gini coefficient, is 
neither included in *
12
P nor in *
22
P . Since P (t) 0′′′ =  for all t, the Gini coefficient neither preserves 
second-degree upward Lorenz dominance nor second-degree downward Lorenz dominance apart from 
the case when the inequality in (i) of Theorems 2.2A and 2.2B holds strictly for u 1=  and u 0= , 
respectively.
15
 Thus, the suggestion of Muliere and Scarsini (1989) that the Gini coefficient is coherent 
with second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a definition of second-degree that abandons 
                                                     
14 See Chateauneuf et al. (2002) for an alternative proof of this result. 
15 Aaberge (2000a) gave an alternative interpretation of this property by demonstrating that the Gini coefficient attaches an 
equal weight to a given transfer irrespective of where it takes place in the income distribution, as long as the income transfer 
occurs between individuals with the same difference in ranks. 
13 
the condition of strict inequality (for some u 0,1∈ ). However, by assuming that the Lorenz curves 
cross only once the following results hold.
16
 
 
 PROPOSITION 2.1A. Assume that L1 and L2 are singly intersecting Lorenz curves and L1 
crosses L2 initially from above, and let ( )1G L  and ( )2G L  be the two corresponding Gini coefficients. 
Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) ( ) ( ) *P 1 P 2 12J L < J L for all P∈P   
(ii) ( ) ( )≤1 2G L G L . 
 
(Proof in Appendix) 
 
 PROPOSITION 2.1B. Assume that L1 and L2 are singly intersecting Lorenz curves and L2 
crosses L1 initially from above, and let ( )1G L  and ( )2G L  be the two corresponding Gini coefficients. 
Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) ( ) ( ) *P 1 P 2 22J L J L for all P< ∈P  
(ii) ( ) ( )≤1 2G L G L . 
 
 The proof of Proposition 2.1B can be achieved by following the line of reasoning used in 
the proof of Proposition 2.1A. Note that Proposition 2.1A can be considered as a dual version of the 
results of Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Dardanoni and Lambert (1988) that clarify the relationship 
between third-degree (upward) stochastic dominance, ordering conditions for the coefficient of 
variation and transfer sensitive measures of inequality.  
 As a preference ordering on L the Gini coefficient in general favors neither the lower nor 
the upper part of the Lorenz curves. Therefore, if we restrict the ranking problem to Lorenz curves 
with equal Gini coefficients, second-degree upward and downward dominance coincide in the sense 
that a Lorenz curve L1 that second-degree upward dominates a Lorenz curve L2 is always second-
degree downward dominated by L2. Thus, it is clear that L1 (and the corresponding distribution 
function) can be obtained from L2 (the corresponding distribution function) by employing a set of 
Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers in combination with an equal set of Pigou-Dalton regressive 
transfers that leaves the Gini mean difference (µG) unchanged, and in which the progressive transfer 
                                                     
16 Zoli (1999) provided a result similar to Proposition 2.1A for singly intersecting generalized Lorenz curves under the 
condition of equal means. 
14 
of each pair of progressive/regressive transfers occurs lower down in the income distribution than the 
regressive transfer. We call such a change a downside mean-Gini-preserving transformation 
(downside MGPT)
17
. A formal definition of downside MGPT is given below. 
 
 DEFINITION 2.7A. Consider a discrete distribution F and a Pigou-Dalton progressive 
transfer δi  from a person with income ( )−1 iF t  to a person with income ( )
−1
i
F s  and a Pigou-Dalton 
regressive transfer γi  from a person with income ( )−1 iF u  to a person with income ( )
−1
i
F v  for 
=i 1,2,...,N . This sequence of combinations of progressive/regressive transfers is a downside mean-
Gini-preserving transformation (downside MGPT) provided that < < <
i i i i
s t u v  for =i 1,2,...,N  and 
the ( )i i,δ γ  pairs are such that the Gini coefficient of the post-transfer distribution is equal to the Gini 
coefficient of F. 
 
 Thus, by applying the downside MGPT inequality is transferred from lower to higher 
parts of the Lorenz curve. By contrast, a social decision-maker who favors second-degree downward 
Lorenz dominance will apply the progressive transfer of each pair of progressive/regressive transfers 
higher up in the income distribution than the regressive transfer. Such a change will be called an 
upside mean-Gini-preserving transformation (upside MGPT)
 18
. In this case inequality is transferred 
from the higher to the lower parts of the Lorenz curve and the corresponding income distribution.  
 
 DEFINITION 2.7B. Consider a discrete distribution F and a Pigou-Dalton regressive 
transfer δi from a person with income ( )−1 iF s  to a person with income ( )
−1
i
F t  and a Pigou-Dalton 
progressive transfer γi  from a person with income ( )−1 iF v  to a person with income ( )
−1
i
F u  for 
=i 1,2,...,N . This sequence of combinations of regressive/progressive transfers is an upside mean-
Gini-preserving transformation (upside MGPT) provided that < < <
i i i i
s t u v  for =i 1,2,...,N  and the 
( )
i i
,δ γ  pairs are such that the Gini coefficient of the post-transfer distribution is equal to the Gini 
coefficient of F. 
                                                     
17 Note that a downside MGPT is equivalent to the favorable composite positional transfer discussed by Zoli (2002). 
18 Note that the MGPT transformations are analogous to the mean-variance-preserving transformation (MVPT) introduced by 
Menezes et al. (1980) and used by Shorrocks and Foster (1987), Dardanoni and Lambert (1988) and Davis and Hoy (1994) as 
a basis for analysing the implications of third-degree stochastic dominance on measurement of inequality and social welfare. 
The major difference between these methods of transformation is that the (downside) MGPT is equivalent to second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance (third-degree upward inverse stochastic dominance), whereas the MVPT is equivalent to third 
degree (upward) stochastic dominance. Moreover, the MGPT relies on the Gini mean difference rather than the variance as a 
measure of spread. Note that the Gini mean difference was used as an (robust) alternative to the variance as a measure of 
spread long before Gini introduced it as a measure of inequality (see David (1968)). 
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 The following theorem demonstrates that a Lorenz curve L1 that second-degree upward 
dominates a Lorenz curve L2 can be obtained from L2 be a sequence of downside MGPTs’ and that the 
Lorenz curve L2 can be obtained from L1 by a sequence of upside MGPTs’. 
 
 THEOREM 2.3. Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients. Then the 
following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 second-degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) L2 second-degree downward dominates L1 
(iii) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of downside MGPTs’. 
(iv) L2 can be obtained from L1 by a sequence of upside MGPTs’. 
 
(Proof in Appendix)
19
. 
 
 When the ranking problem is restricted to Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients then 
the condition that a downside MGPT (an upside MGPT) reduces inequality is equivalent to the 
condition for satisfying the principle of first-degree DPTS (UPTS).  
3.  Lorenz dominance of i
th
-degree and mean-spread-preserving 
transformations 
Since situations where second-degree (upward or downward) Lorenz dominance does not provide 
unambiguous ranking of Lorenz curves may arise, it will be useful to introduce weaker dominance criteria 
than second-degree Lorenz dominance. To this end we will introduce two hierarchical sequences of nested 
Lorenz dominance criteria; one departs from second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and the other from 
second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. As explained in Section 2, the choice between second-
degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance clarifies whether focus is turned to changes that take 
place in the lower or upper part of the income distribution. Thus, a person who favors second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance would most likely prefer third-degree and higher degrees of upward Lorenz 
dominance to third-degree and higher degrees of downward Lorenz dominance. Conversely, when the 
value judgment of a person is consistent with the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance, higher degrees of downward Lorenz dominance are likely more acceptable than higher 
degrees of upward Lorenz dominance. 
                                                     
19 An alternative proof of the equivalence between (i) and (iii) was provided by Zoli (2002). 
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 As will become evident below it is convenient to use the following notation, 
(5) ( )
u u
2 1
0 0
1
L (u) L(t)dt u t F (t)dt, 0 u 1,−= = − ≤ ≤
µ∫ ∫   
 
u
i 1 i
0
L (u) L (t)dt, 0 u 1, i 2,3,...,+ = ≤ ≤ =∫  
and 
(6) ( ) ( )
1 1
2 1
u u
1
L (u) 1 L(t) dt t u F (t)dt, 0 u 1,−= − = − ≤ ≤
µ∫ ∫
%   
 
1
i 1 i
u
L (u) L (t)dt, 0 u 1, i 2,3,....+ = ≤ ≤ =∫% %  
 Now, using integration by parts, we obtain the following alternative expressions for L
i+1
 
and 
i 1
L
+% , respectively, 
(7) 
( )
( ) ( )
u u
i 1 ii 1 1
0 0
1 1
L (u) u t L(t)dt u t F (t)dt, i 2,3,...
i 1 ! i!
−+ −
= − = − =
− µ
∫ ∫   
and 
(8) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
i 1 ii 1 1
u u
1 1
L (u) t u 1 L(t) dt t u F (t)dt, i 2,3,... .
i 1 ! i!
−+ −
= − − = − =
− µ
∫ ∫%   
It is easily verified that L
i+1
(1) defined by (7) is a linear transformation of a measure of inequality that 
belongs to the extended Gini family of inequality measures
20
 { }:
i
G i 1≥ , 
(9) 
( )
( )i 1 i
1
L (1) 1 G (L) , i 1,2,...
i 1 !
+
= − =
+
  
where 
                                                     
20 The extended Gini family of inequality measures was introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983) and Yitzhaki 
(1983). 
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(10) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
i 1 i
i
0 0
1
G (L) 1 i i 1 1 u L(u)du 1 F(x) 1 1 F(x) dx, i 1.
∞
−
= − + − = − − − ≥
µ∫ ∫   
Moreover, from the definition (8) of L%  we get that 
(11) 
( )
( )i 1 i
1
L (0) iD (L) 1 , i 1,2,...
i 1 !
+
= + =
+
%   
where 
(12) ( ) ( )
1
i 1 i
i
0 0
1
D (L) 1 i 1 u L(u)du F(x) 1 F (x) dx, i 1,2,...
i
∞
−
= − + = − =
µ
∫ ∫   
and { }iD : i 1,2,...=  is an alternative “generalized” Gini family of inequality measures denoted the 
Lorenz family of inequality measures
21
, where 
1 1
D G=  is equal to the Gini coefficient. 
 As was demonstrated by Aaberge (2000a) there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
subfamilies of the extended Gini and the Lorenz families of inequality measures shown by the 
following equation 
(13) ( ) ( )
i
k
i k
k 1
i k
G (L) 1 i 1 ( 1) 1 D (L) , i 1,2,...
k k 1
=
 
= + + − − = 
+ 
∑ .  
Thus, the extended Gini subfamily { }iG (L) : i 1,2,..., r=  is uniquely determined by the corresponding 
Lorenz subfamily { }iD (L) : i 1,2,..., r=  for any integer r. 
 Expressions (7) and (8) show that L
i+1
 places more weight on changes in the lower and 
i 1
L
+%  on changes in the upper part of the Lorenz curve as i increases.  
 As generalizations of Definitions 2.4A and 2.4B we introduce the notions of i
th
-degree 
upward and downward Lorenz dominance
22
. Note that subscripts i and j in the notation ijL  and 
i
jL
%  
used below refer to dominance of i
th
-degree for Lorenz curve Lj and that 
1
jL  is the Lorenz curve Lj and 
1
j jL 1 L= −
% . 
 
                                                     
21 The Lorenz family of inequality measures was introduced by Aaberge (2000a) and proves to be a subclass of the "illfare-
ranked single-series Ginis" discussed by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Bossert (1990). 
22 A similar definition of ith degree (upward) inverse stochastic dominance was introduced by Muliere and Scarsini (1989). 
Note that Definitions 3.1A and 3.1B do not require any restrictions on the Lorenz curves (or the distribution functions) and 
thus differ in this sense from the definitions of stochastic dominance proposed by Whitmore (1970) and Chew (1983). 
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 DEFINITION 3.1A. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to i
th
-degree upward dominate a Lorenz 
curve L2 if  
 [ ]i i1 2L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1u∈ . 
 
 DEFINITION 3.1B. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to i
th
-degree downward dominate a Lorenz 
curve L2 if  
 [ ]i i2 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈% %  
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1u∈ . 
 
 Note that ( )i th+ 1 -degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance are less restrictive 
dominance criteria than i
th
-degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance and thus can prove to be 
useful decision criteria in situations where i
th
-degree dominance does not yield an unambiguous 
ranking of Lorenz curves. 
 It follows from the definitions (7) and (8) of L
i
 and 
iL%  that 
 
i i
1 2
L (u) L (u) for all u≥   implies  i 1 i 1
1 2
L (u) L (u) for all u ,+ +≥  
and that 
 
i i
2 1
L (u) L (u) for all u≥% %   implies  i 1 i 1
2 1
L (u) L (u) for all u+ +≥% % , 
which means that ( )
th
i 1+ -degree upward Lorenz dominance preserves i
th
-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance and that ( )
th
i 1+ -degree downward Lorenz dominance preserves i
th
-degree downward 
Lorenz dominance. 
 Thus, the various degrees of upward and downward Lorenz dominance form two separate 
sequences of nested dominance criteria, which turn out to be useful for dividing the JP-family of 
inequality measures into nested subfamilies. To this end it will be convenient to introduce the 
following notation. Let P
(j)
 denote the j
th
 derivative of P and let * ** *** * ** ***
1i 1i 1i 1i 2i 2i 2i 2i
, , , , , , ,P P P P P P P P  be 
families of preference functions defined by 
19 
 
( ) [ ]{ }i 1 ( j)1i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 and P (1) 0, j 2,3,...,i+= ∈ = =P P , 
 { }* j ( j 1)1i 1iP : P and ( 1) P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i+= ∈ − > ∈ =P P , 
 
( ){ }i 1** i1i 1iP : P and ( 1) P (t) 0 for t 0,1+= ∈ − > ∈P P , 
( ) [ ] ( ){ }i 1 i 1*** i j 1 ( j)1i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 , ( 1) P (t) 0 for t 0,1 and ( 1) P (1) 0, j 2,3,...,i ,+ + −= ∈ − > ∈ − ≥ =P P
 
 
( ) [ ]{ }i 1 ( j)2i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 and P (0) 0, j 2,3,...,i+= ∈ = =P P , 
 { }* ( j 1)2i 2iP : P and P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i+= ∈ < ∈ =P P , 
 
( ){ }i 1**2i 2iP : P and P (t) 0 for t 0,1+= ∈ < ∈P P , 
and 
 
( ) [ ] ( ){ }i 1 i 1*** ( j)2i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 , P (t) 0 for t 0,1 and P (0) 0, j 2,3,...,i+ += ∈ < ∈ ≤ =P P , 
respectively. Note that * ** ***
1i 1i 1i
⊂ ⊂P P P  and * ** ***
2i 2i 2i
⊂ ⊂P P P . 
 The subfamilies of the JP-family formed by 
** **
1i 2iandP P  are characterized by the 
following theorems. 
 
 THEOREM 3.1A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 i
th
-degree upward dominates L2. 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ **P 1 P 2 1iJ L J L for all P P . 
 
(Proof in Appendix). 
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 THEOREM 3.1B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 i
th
-degree downward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ **P 1 P 2 2iJ L J L for all P P . 
 
(Proof in Appendix). 
 
 The criteria of Lorenz dominance offer convenient computational methods for applied 
work. As is demonstrated by Theorems 3.1A and 3.1B this approach is particular attractive since it 
provides identification of the restrictions on the preference function P that are needed to reach 
unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves.
23
 As will be demonstrated in Section 4 the extended Gini 
inequality measure Gk satisfies the conditions 
jP (1) 0, j 2,3,...,k= = , whereas the Lorenz family 
measure Dk satisfies the conditions 
( j)P (0) 0, j 2,3,...,k= = .  
 To judge the normative significance of i
th
-degree upward and downward Lorenz 
dominance, it appears helpful to strengthen the principles of first-degree downside and upside 
positional transfer sensitivity to be more sensitive to transfers that take place lower down (higher up) 
in the income distribution.
24
 To this end it will be useful  to introduce the following notation. Let 
( )2 s,t 1 2I ,h ,h∆ δ  be defined by 
 Note that 1 s,tI 0∆ <  for any s t<  when I obeys the first-degree UPTS. Since the principle 
of second-degree UPTS is meant to strengthen the principle of first-degree UPTS, it follows from (14) 
that this is obtained when 
2 s,t
I 0∆ >  for s t< . Thus, we can only discern between second-degree 
DPTS and second-degree UPTS if these principles are required to be linked to first-degree DPTS and 
first-degree UPTS, respectively. Thus, when a sequence of first-degree DPTS (UPTS) transfers is 
valued more the lower down (higher up) the sequence of the transfers occurs, the sequence of transfers 
is made in line with the principle of second-degree downside (upside) positional transfer sensitivity. 
To deal with i
th
-degree Lorenz dominance it is convenient to introduce the notation 
( )i s,t 1 2 iI ,h ,h ,...,h∆ δ  defined by 
(15) ( ) ( ) ( )
i i
i s,t 1 2 i i 1 s,t 1 2 i 1 i 1 s h ,t h 1 2 i 1
I ,h ,h ,...,h I ,h ,h ,...,h I ,h ,h ,...,h , i 3,4,...
− − − + + −
∆ δ = ∆ δ − ∆ δ =   
                                                     
23 Note that Muliere and Scarsini (1989) provided a characterization of ith-degree upward Lorenz dominance (inverse 
stochastic dominance) in terms of order conditions for a subfamily of 
*
1i
P . 
24 Note that Fishburn and Willig (1984) introduced an extension of Kolm’s principle of diminishing transfers to higher-order 
transfer principles and demonstrated that these principles are associated to higher orders of upward stochastic dominance. 
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 DEFINITION 3.4A. Consider a discrete income distribution F, an inequality measure I 
that obeys the ( )−
th
i 1 -degree DPTS, and rank-preserving transfers δ from individuals with ranks 
+
1
s h , + + + +
1 2 1 i
s h h ,...,s h h ,...,  + + + +
1 2 i
s h h ... h ,  +
1
t h ,  + + + +
1 2 1 i
t h h ,...,t h h ,...,  
+ + + +
1 2 i
t h h ... h  to individuals with ranks s, 
+ + + + + + + + + + + +
2 i 2 3 i 2 i 2 3 i
s h ,...,s h ,...,s h h ... h ,t ,t h ,...,t h ,...,t h h ... h  in F. Then I is said to satisfy 
the principle of i
th
-degree downside positional transfer sensitivity, the i
th
-degree DPTS, if 
 ( )i s ,t 1 2 iI ,h ,h ,...,h 0 when s t∆ δ > < . 
 DEFINITION 3.4B. Consider a discrete income distribution F, an inequality measure I 
that obeys the ( )−
th
i 1 -degree UPTS, and rank-preserving transfers δ from individuals with ranks 
+
1
s h , + + + +
1 2 1 i
s h h ,...,s h h ,...,  + + + +
1 2 i
s h h ... h ,  +
1
t h ,  + + + +
1 2 1 i
t h h ,...,t h h ,...,  
+ + + +
1 2 i
t h h ... h  to individuals with ranks s, 
+ + + + + + + + + + + +
2 i 2 3 i 2 i 2 3 i
s h ,...,s h ,...,s h h ... h ,t ,t h ,...,t h ,...,t h h ... h  in F. Then I is said to satisfy 
the principle of i
th
-degree upside positional transfer sensitivity, the i
th
-degree UPTS, if 
 ( )i s ,t 1 2 iI ,h ,h ,...,h 0 when s t and i 2k 1, k 1,2,...,∆ δ < < = − =  
and 
 ( )i s ,t 1 2 iI ,h ,h ,...,h 0 when s t and i 2k , k 1,2,...∆ δ > < = = . 
 
 The motivation for introducing the principle of ( )
th
i 1− -degree DPTS was to strengthen 
the principle of ( )
th
i 2− -degree DPTS. A similar consideration is valid for ( )
th
i 1− -degree UPTS. As 
stated in Theorems 3.2A and 3.2B support of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principles 
of DPTS of each degree up to i 1−  is equivalent to be in favor of the criterion of i
th
-degree upward 
Lorenz dominance, whereas support of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principles of 
UPTS of each degree up to i 1−  is equivalent to be in favor of i
th
-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance. 
 
 THEOREM 3.2A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 i
th
-degree upward dominates L2 
22 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ *P 1 P 2 1iJ L J L for all P P  
(iii) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  for all 1iP∈P  being such that JP obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers and the principles of DPTS up to and including (i-1)
th
-degree. 
 
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
 THEOREM 3.2B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 i
th
-degree downward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ *P 1 P 2 2iJ L J L for all P P  
(iii) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  for all 2iP∈P  being such that JP obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers and the principles of UPTS up to and including (i-1)
th
-degree. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 3.2B can be achieved by following the line of reasoning used in 
the proof of Theorem 3.2.A. 
 As noted above the motivation for introducing the principles of DPTS (UPTS) was to 
successively strengthen the emphasis of transfers taking place lower down (higher up) in the income 
distribution. To characterize social preferences that are consistent with these principles we adopt the 
following definition. 
 
 DEFINITION 3.5. A social decision-maker that supports the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers and the principles of DPTS (UPTS) up to and including i
th
-degree is said to exhibit downside 
(upside) inequality aversion of i
th
-degree. 
 
 By adding the condition of dominating extended Gini coefficients Gk for k 1,2,...,i 1= −  
to the condition of i
th
-degree upward Lorenz dominance it follows from the proof of Theorem 3.1A 
that the conditions ( j)P (1) 0, j 2,3,...,i= =  can be replaced by less restrictive conditions for P, which 
means that the subfamily of JP-measures that preserves a “restricted” i
th
-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance condition is larger than the subfamily of JP-measures that preserves i
th
-degree upward 
Lorenz dominance. Moreover, as indicated above, the latter is a subfamily of the former.
25
  
                                                     
25 Wang and Young (1998) provide a result similar to Theorem 3.3B for intersecting distribution functions. However, their 
result relies on the condition of negative derivatives (up to order i) of P whereas the condition for P used in Theorem 3.3B is 
less strict. Moreover, Wang and Young (1998) don’t appear to be aware of the fact that their result concerns downward rather 
than upward inverse stochastic dominance. 
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 THEOREM 3.3A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 i
th
-degree upward dominates L2 and ( ) ( )≤k 1 k 2G L G L  for = −k 1,2,...,i 1  
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ ***P 1 P 2 1iJ L J L for all P P . 
 
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
 THEOREM 3.3B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are 
equivalent, 
(i) L1 i
th
-degree downward dominates L2 and ( ) ( )≤ = −k 1 k 2D L D L for k 1,2,...,i 1  
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ ***P 1 P 2 2iJ L J L for all P .P  
 
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
 As we demonstrated in Section 2, first-degree DPTS (UPTS) could be given an 
alternative interpretation in terms of a mean-Gini-preserving transformation. This equivalence arises 
due to the fact that second-degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance “coincide” when the Gini 
coefficient (or the mean and the Gini mean difference) of the Lorenz curves are equal. By assuming 
that L
3
(1) defined by (9) is kept fixed, a similar interpretation of second-degree DPTS in terms of a 
mean-Gini-L
3
(1)-preserving transformation can be obtained. Requiring L
3
(1) to be equal across 
Lorenz curves is equivalent to require that the extended Gini measure of inequality G2(L) (or its 
absolute version and the mean) is kept fixed. Thus, in order to obtain the upward dominating L
2
-curve 
from the dominated L
2
-curve we may use combinations of downside and upside MGPTs’ that are 
carried out under the conditions of equal Gini coefficients and equal G2-coefficients. Similarly, we 
find that the downward dominating L
2
-curve can be obtained from the dominated L
2
-curve by 
combinations of downside and upside MGPTs’ provided that 3L (0)%  is kept fixed, which according to 
(11) is equivalent to require that the D2-coefficients are equal. However, when the requirement of 
equal D2-coefficients are made in combination with the condition of equal Gini-coefficients, it follows 
from equation (13) that this is equivalent to require equal G2-coefficients in combination with equal 
Gini coefficients. Formal definitions of downside and upside mean-Gini-G2-preserving (or mean-Gini-
L
3
(1)-preserving) transformations are given by 
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 DEFINITION 3.6. Consider a discrete distribution F, a downside MGPT of two amounts 
( )1 1,δ γ  and an upside MGPT of two amounts ( )2 2,δ γ . This pair of transformations is a downside 
mean-Gini-G2-preserving transformation (downside MG2PT) provided that the pairs ( )1 1,δ γ  and 
( )2 2,δ γ  are such that the G2-coefficient of the post-transfer distribution is equal to the G2-coefficient 
of F, and the downside MGPT occurs lower down in the income distribution than the upside MGPT. 
By contrast, when the upside MGPT occurs lower than the downside MGPT we say that the pair of 
transformations is an upside mean-Gini-G2-preserving transformation (upside MG2PT). 
 
 As indicated above there is a similarity between third-degree and second-degree Lorenz 
dominance in the sense that both dominance criteria can be given a normative characterization in 
terms of principles for positional transfer sensitivity and mean-“spread”-preserving transformations. 
Moreover, as for the second-degree dominance criteria, upward and downward third-degree Lorenz 
dominance require the same measures of “spread” (inequality) to be kept fixed in order to obey the 
principle of mean-“spread”-preserving transformation
26
. Keeping the Gini coefficient and G2 fixed is, 
as noted above, equivalent to keeping the Gini coefficient and D2 fixed. This means that upside as well 
as downside MG2PT relies on fixed G2- and D2-coefficients. Observe that the scaled-up (the absolute) 
version of D2 (or 
3L (0)% ) can be considered as a measure of right spread, i.e. it is more sensitive to 
changes that affect the spread in the upper part of the income distribution rather than in changes that 
affect the spread in the lower part of the income distribution. By contrast, the scaled-up version of G2 
can be considered as a measure of left-spread. Accordingly, it is more sensitive to changes in spread 
that occur in the lower rather in the upper part of the income distribution. Thus, upside and downside 
MG2PT place more emphasis on the tails than the upside and downside mean-Gini-preserving 
transformation. The downside mean-Gini-G2-preserving transformation reduces inequality (spread) in 
the lower part of the income distribution at the expense of increased inequality in the middle/upper 
part of the income distribution, whereas the upside mean-Gini-G2-preserving transformation reduces 
inequality (spread) in the upper part of the income distribution at the expense of increased inequality 
in the middle/lower part of the income distribution. In order to place even stronger emphasis on the 
tails we may introduce higher-order mean-“spread”-preserving transformations. 
 
                                                     
26 In contrast to the absolute Gini-coefficient note that the absolute versions of Gi defined by (10) and Di defined by (12) do 
not fulfill the standard conditions of being measures of spread (dispersion) when i>1, but can be used as measures of left and 
right spread, respectively. See Fernández-Ponce et al. (1998) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1998) for discussions on 
measurement of right spread. 
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 DEFINITION 3.7. Consider a discrete distribution F, a downside MGi-1PT of two 
amounts ( )1 1,δ γ  and an upside MGi-1PT of two amounts ( )2 2,δ γ . This pair of transformations is a 
downside mean-Gini-G2-…-Gi-preserving transformation (downside MGiPT) provided that the pairs 
( )1 1,δ γ  and ( )2 2,δ γ  are such that the Gi-coefficient of F, and the downside MGi-1PT occurs lower 
down in the income distribution than the upside MGi-1PT. By contrast, when the upside MGi-1PT 
occurs lower than the downside MGi-1PT we say that the pair of transformations is an upside mean-
Gini-G2-…-Gi-preserving transformation (upside MGiPT). 
 
 The following theorems demonstrate that a Lorenz curve L1 that ( )
th
i 1+ -degree upward 
(downward) dominates a Lorenz curve L2 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of downside (upside) 
MGiPTs’. 
 
 THEOREM 3.4A. Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients and 
( ) ( )j 1 j 2G L G L , j 2,3,...,i= = . Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 (i+1)
th
-degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( )<P 1 P 2J L J L  for all P such that 
( )+i 2
P  is continuous on [ ]0,1  and 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
+ +
− > ∈
i 1 i 2
1 P u 0 for u 0,1  
(iii) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of downside MGiPTs’ 
 
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
 THEOREM 3.4B. Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients and 
( ) ( )j 1 j 2G L G L , j 2,3,...,i= = . Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 ( )
th
i 1+ -degree downward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( )<P 1 P 2J L J L  for all P such that 
( )+i 2
P  is continuous on [ ]0,1  and 
 
( ) ( )+ < ∈i 2P u 0 for u 0,1  
(iii) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of upside MGiPTs'. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 3.4B can be constructed by following exactly the line of reasoning 
used in the proof of Theorem 3.4A. 
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 Since downside as well as upside MGiPT relies on equal Gini coefficients and 
( ) ( )j 1 j 2G L G L , j 2,3,...,i= = , it will be of interest to explore the relationship between these two 
transformation approaches. To this end we draw on Theorems 3.4A and 3.4B, from which we can 
derive the following results. 
 
 COROLLARY 3.1A. Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients and 
( ) ( )j 1 j 2G L G L , j 2,3,...,i= = . Then the following statements are equivalent for i 2k , k 1,2,...= = , 
(i) L1 ( )
th
i 1+ -degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) L1 ( )
th
i 1+ -degree downward dominates L2 
(iii) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  when 
( ) ( )i 2P u 0 for u 0,1+ < ∈  
(iv) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of downside MGiPTs' 
(v) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of upside MGiPTs'. 
 
 COROLLARY 3.1B. Let L1 and L2 be Lorenz curves with equal Gini coefficients and 
( ) ( )j 1 j 2G L G L , j 2,3,...,i= = . Then the following statements are equivalent for i 2k 1, k 1,2,...= − = , 
(i) L1 ( )
th
i 1+ -degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) L2 ( )
th
i 1+ -degree downward dominates L1 
(iii) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  when 
( ) ( )i 2P u 0 for u 0,1+ > ∈  
(iv) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of downside MGiPTs' 
(v) L2 can be obtained from L1 by a sequence of upside MGiPTs'. 
 
 REMARK. As demonstrated above the condition of equal Gini coefficients and 
( ) ( )j 1 j 2G L G L , j 2,3,...,i= =  is equivalent to the condition of equal Gini coefficients and 
( ) ( )j 1 j 2D L D L , j 2,3,...,i= = . Thus, the downside and upside mean-Gini-G2-…-Gi-preserving 
transformations could alternatively have been denoted the downside and upside mean-Gini-D2-…-Di-
preserving transformations. 
 
 The proposed sequences of dominance criteria along with the results of Theorems 3.1A-
3.4A and 3.1B-3.4B suggest two alternative strategies for increasing the number of Lorenz curves that 
can be strictly ordered by successively narrowing the class of inequality measures under consideration. 
As the dominance criteria of each sequence are nested these strategies also allow us to identify the 
27 
value judgments that are needed to reach an unambiguous ranking of Lorenz curves. It follows from 
Theorem 3.2A that JP-measures derived from P-functions with derivatives between second and i
th
 
order that alternate in sign ( )( )− > =−1 0 2 31j jP t j i( ) ( ) , , , ... ,  preserve upward Lorenz dominance of all 
degrees lower than and equal to i-1. Thus, as demonstrated by Theorem 3.2A their sensitivity to 
changes that occur in the lower part of the income distribution (and the Lorenz curve) increases as i 
increases. By contrast, Theorem 3.2B shows that JP-measures derived from P-functions with negative 
derivatives of order two and up to i ( )P t j ij( ) ( ) , , , ... ,< =0 2 3  preserve downward Lorenz dominance of 
all degrees lower than and equal to i-1. Theorem 3.2B demonstrates that this means that they increase 
their sensitivity to changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve as i increases. Note that the 
theorems, propositions and corollaries introduced above are only valid for finite i. At the extreme, as 
i→∞ , observe that 
(16) ( ) i 1 1
0, 0 u 1
i 1 !L (u) F (0 )
, u 1
+ −
≤ <

+ → +
= µ
  
and 
(17) ( )
1
i 1
F (1)
, u 0
i 1 !L (u)
0, 0 u 1,
−
+

=
+ → µ
 < ≤
%   
where F
-1
(0+) and F
-1
(1) denote the lowest and highest income, respectively. Hence, at the limit 
upward and downward Lorenz dominance solely depend on the income share of the worst-off and 
best-off income recipient, respectively. At the extreme upward Lorenz dominance is solely concerned 
with transfers that benefit the poorest unit. By contrast, downward Lorenz dominance solely focuses 
on transferring money from the richest to anyone else. 
 
 REMARK. Restricting the comparisons of Lorenz curves to distributions with equal 
means the various dominance results of Sections 2 and 3 are valid for generalized Lorenz curves and 
also apply to the so-called dual theory representation for choice under uncertainty introduced by Yaari 
(1987, 1988). 
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4.  The relationship between downward and upward Lorenz 
dominance and generalized Gini families of inequality 
measures 
The dominance results in Sections 2 and 3 show that application of the criteria of upward Lorenz 
dominance requires a higher degree of aversion to downside inequality the higher is the degree of upward 
Lorenz dominance. A similar relationship holds between downward Lorenz dominance and aversion to 
upside inequality aversion. As suggested in Section 3 the highest degree of downside inequality aversion 
is achieved when focus is exclusively turned to the situation of the worst-off income recipient. Thus, the 
most downside inequality averse JP-measure that is obtained as the preference function approaches 
(18) 
d
0, t 0
P (t)
1, 0 t 1,
=
= 
< ≤
  
can be considered as the JP-measure that exhibits the highest degree of downside inequality aversion. 
As Pd is not differentiable, it is not a member of the family P1 of inequality averse preference 
functions, but it is recognizable as the upper limit of inequality aversion for members of P1. Inserting 
(18) in (2) yields 
(19) 
d
1
P
F (0 )
J (L) 1 .
−
+
= −
µ
  
Hence, the inequality measure 
dP
J  corresponds to the Rawlsian maximin criterion. Since 
dP
J  is 
compatible with the limiting case of upward Lorenz dominance the Rawlsian (relative) maximin 
criterion preserves all degrees of upward Lorenz dominance and rejects downward Lorenz dominance. 
 By contrast, the JP-measure that is obtained as P approaches
27
 
(20) 
u
1, 0 t 1
P (t)
0, t 1,
≤ <
= 
=
  
exhibits the highest degree of upside inequality aversion. Inserting (20) in (2) yields 
(21) 
u
1
P
F (1)
J (L) 1 .
−
= +
µ
  
Thus, 
uP
J , which we will denote the relative minimax criterion, is “dual” to the Rawlsian (relative) 
maximin criterion in the sense that it is compatible with the limiting case of downward Lorenz 
                                                     
27 Note that the normalization condition P'(0)=1 is ignored in this case. 
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dominance. When the comparison of Lorenz curves is based on the relative minimax criterion the 
Lorenz curve for which the largest relative income is smaller is preferred, regardless of all other 
differences. The only transfer which decreases inequality is a transfer from the richest unit to anyone 
else. 
 Based on the results in Sections 2 and 3, we shall now demonstrate how the above Lorenz 
dominance results can be applied to evaluate the ranking properties of the Lorenz and the extended 
Gini families of inequality measures. The extended Gini family is defined by (10). Note that 
{ }kG :k 0>  is a subfamily of { }J PP : ∈P1  formed by the following family of P-functions, 
(22) k 1
1k
P (t) 1 (1 t) , k 0.+= − − ≥   
 Differentiating P1k defined by (22), we find that 
(23) 
j 1 k j 1
( j)
1k
(k 1)!
( 1) (1 t) , j 1,2,...,k 1
(k j 1)!P (t)
0 , j k 2,k 3,...
− − +
+
− − = +
− += 
 = + +
  
As can be observed from (23) the weight function P1k of the extended Gini family of inequality 
measures is a member of *
1i
P  (and **
1i
P ) for k i,i 1,...= + . Thus, we get the following result from 
Theorem 3.2A.
28
 
 
 COROLLARY 4.1A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then  
(i) L1 i
th
-degree upward dominates L2 
implies 
(ii) ( ) ( )k 1 k 2G L <G L for k = i,i+1,i+2,...  
 
 Equation (23) implies that 
1k
P (t) 0′′ <  for all t ∈ 0 1,  when k > 0  and thus that the Gk-
measures satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers for k > 0 . Moreover, 
1k
P (t) 0′′′ >  for all 
t ∈ 0 1,  when k >1 . Hence all Gk for k >1  preserve second-degree upward Lorenz dominance. 
Moreover, the derivatives of Pk alternate in sign up to the ( )k
th
+1  derivative and ( j)1kP (1) 0=  for all 
j k≤ . Thus, it follows from Theorem 3.2A that Gk preserves upward Lorenz dominance of degree k 
and obeys the principles of DPTS up to and including th(k 1)− -degree. The highest degree of 
downside inequality averse behavior occurs as k→∞ , which corresponds to the inequality averse 
                                                     
28 Muliere and Scarsini (1989) gave an alternative proof of Corollary 4.1A  
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behavior of the Rawlsian (relative) maximin criterion. Thus, Gk satisfies all degrees of upward Lorenz 
dominance as k→∞ . At the other extreme, as k 0= , the preference function 
0
P (t) t= , which means 
that 
0
P
J  does not obey the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers or any principle of DPTS. The stated 
properties of the Gk-measures are summarized in the following corollary, 
 
 COROLLARY 4.2A. The extended Gini family of inequality measures defined by (10) has 
the following properties, 
(i) Gk preserves upward Lorenz dominance of degree k and all degrees lower than k, 
(ii)  Gk obeys the principle of transfers for k 0> , 
(iii) Gk obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principles of DPTS up to and 
 including (k-1)
th
 degree, 
(iv) If ( ) ( )<k 1 k 2G L G L  then ( )k 1G L  can be obtained from ( )k 2G L  by a sequence of downside 
−
′
k 1
MG PTs . 
(v) The sequence { }kG approaches 0  as k 0→ . 
(vi) The sequence { }kG  approaches the Rawlsian relative maximin criterion as k→∞ . 
 
 Note that P1k has negative derivatives (of any order) when 0 k 1< < . Thus, Gk for 
0 k 1< <  preserves downward Lorenz dominance of all degrees. 
 As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000a) the Lorenz family of inequality measures is a 
subfamily of { }J PP : ∈P1  formed by the following family of P-functions, 
(24) ( )( )k 12k
1
P (t) k 1 t t , k 1,2,...
k
+
= + − =   
Differentiating P2k defined by (24) yields 
(25) 
( )( )( ) ( ) k j 1( j)
2k
k 1 k 1 k 2 .... k j 2 t , j 2,3,..., k 1
P (t)
0 , j k 2,k 3,...
− +− + − − − + = +
= 
= + +
   
By noting from (25) that the weight-function P2k of the Lorenz family of inequality measures is a 
member of *
2i
P  for k i,i 1,...,= +  we obtain the following result from Theorem 3.2B. 
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 COROLLARY 4.1B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then  
(i) L1 i
th
-degree downward dominates L2 
implies 
(ii) ( ) ( )k 1 k 2D L < D L for k = i, i+1, i+2,....  
and 
-1 -1
1 2
1 2
F (1) F (1)
< .
µ µ
 
 
 The results of a similar evaluation of the Lorenz family of inequality measures as that carried 
out for the extended Gini family are summarized in the following corollary. 
 COROLLARY 4.2B. The Lorenz family of inequality measures defined by (12) has the 
following properties, 
(i) Dk  preserves downward Lorenz dominance of degree k and all degrees lower than k, 
(ii) Dk obeys the principle of transfers for >k 0 , 
(iii) Dk obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the principles of UPTS up to and including 
(k-1)
th
 degree, 
(iv) If ( ) ( )<k 1 k 2D L D L  then ( )k 1D L  can be obtained from ( )k 2D L  by e sequence of upside 
−
′
k 1
DG PTs . 
(v) The sequence { }kD approaches 0  as k→∞ . 
(vi) The sequence { }1kkD +  approaches the relative minimax criterion as k→∞ . 
 
 Note that the derivatives of P2k alternate in sign when 1 k 1− < < . Thus, Dk for 1 k 1− < <  
preserves upward Lorenz dominance of all degrees and approaches the Rawlsian relative maximin as k 
approaches -1. As demonstrated by Aaberge (2000a) Dk approaches the Bonferroni coefficient as 
k 0→ . 
 Corollary 4.1A shows that the various degrees of upward Lorenz dominance is preserved 
by sub-families of the extended Gini measures of inequality, which divide the integer subscript 
subclass of the extended Gini family into nested subfamilies. Thus, the hierarchical sequence of nested 
upward Lorenz dominance criteria offers a convenient computational method for identifying the 
largest subfamily of the integer subscript extended Gini family of inequality measures that is 
consistent with the actual ranking of Lorenz curves. As demonstrated by Corollary 4.1B the various 
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degrees of downward Lorenz dominance divide the Lorenz family of inequality measures into a 
similar sequence of nested subfamilies.  
5. Summary and discussion 
This paper introduces two sequences of partial orderings for achieving complete rankings of Lorenz 
curves. In particular, we have examined situations where Lorenz curves intersect by introducing 
ranking criteria that are weaker than non-intersecting dominance (first-degree Lorenz dominance) and 
stronger than single measures of inequality. The proposed dominance criteria are shown to 
characterize nested subsets of the families of inequality measures defined by ∫ ′P u d L u( ) ( ) where P' 
is the derivative of a function P that defines the inequality aversion profile of the inequality measure. 
The condition of first-degree Lorenz dominance corresponds to concave P-functions. By introducing 
higher degrees of dominance, this paper provides a method for identifying the lowest degree of 
dominance and the weakest restriction on the functional form of the preference function P that is 
needed to reach unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves, irrespective of whether one’s social 
preferences is consistent with downside or upside inequality aversion. To judge the normative 
significance of the sequences of dominance criteria, appropriate principles of transfers and mean-
“spread”-preserving transformations have been introduced. The criteria of Lorenz dominance provide 
convenient computational methods for ranking a set of Lorenz curves and for exploring how robust the 
attained ranking would be with respect to choice of rank-dependent measures of inequality. Thus, in 
applied work the ranking obtained by applying this approach should in general have a wider degree of 
support than that obtained by applying arbitrarily chosen summary measures of inequality.  
 To deal with the mean income income inequality trade-off, in cases where they conflict, 
Shorrocks (1983) introduced the “generalized Lorenz curve”, defined as a mean scaled-up version of 
the Lorenz curve. Moreover, Shorrocks (1983) obtained characterizations of social welfare functions 
based on first-degree dominance relations between generalized Lorenz curves. Thus, scaling up the 
introduced Lorenz dominance relations of this paper by the mean income (µ) and replacing the rank-
dependent measures of inequality JP defined by (2) with the rank-dependent social welfare functions 
WP = µ(1− JP), it can be demonstrated that the present results also apply to the generalized Lorenz 
curve and moreover provide convenient characterizations of the corresponding social welfare 
orderings.  
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Appendix 
Proofs of Dominance Results 
 
 LEMMA 1. Let H be the family of bounded, continuous and non-negative functions on [0,1] 
which are positive on 〈0,1〉 and let g be an arbitrary bounded and continuous function on [0,1]. Then 
 ∫ > ∈g(t) h(t) dt 0 for all h H  
implies 
 [ ]g(t) 0 for all t 0,1≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for at least one t 0 1∈ , .  
 
 The proof of Lemma 1 is known from mathematical textbooks. 
 The proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2.2A is analogous to the 
proof for stochastic dominance in Hadar and Russel (1969) but is included below for the sake of 
completeness. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 2.2A. Using integration by parts we have that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )J L J L P L u L u du P u L t L t dt duP P
u
2 1
0
1
1 2
0
1
0
1 2
1− = − ′′ − + ′′′ −∫ ∫ ∫( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .  
Thus, if (i) holds then ( ) ( )J L J LP P2 1>  for all P ∈P2 . 
 To prove the converse statement we restrict to preference functions P ∈P
2
 for which 
′′ =P ( )1 0 . Hence, 
 ( ) ( ) ( )J L J L P u L t L t dt duP P
u
2 1
0
1
0
1 2
− = ′′′ −∫ ∫( ) ( ) ( )  
and the desired result it obtained by applying Lemma 1. 
 To prove the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) consider a case where we transfer a small 
amount γ from persons with incomes ( )1 1F s h
−
+  and ( )1 1F t h
−
+  to persons with incomes 1F (s)−  and 
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1F (t)− , respectively, where t is assumed to be larger than s. Then JP defined by (2) obeys the first-
degree DPTS if and only if 
 ( ) ( )1 1P (s) P s h P (t) P t h′ ′ ′ ′− + > − +  
which for small h1 is equivalent to 
 P (t) P (s) 0′′ ′− > . 
Next, inserting for 
2
t s h= + , we find, for small h2, that this is equivalent to P (s) 0′′′ > . 
 
 The proof of Theorem 2.2B is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.2A and is based on 
the expression 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
P 2 P 1 1 2 1 2
0 0 u
J L J L P (0) L (t) L (t) dt P (u) L (t) L (t) dt du′′ ′′′− = − − − −∫ ∫ ∫  
which is obtained by using integration by parts. Thus, by arguments like those in the proof of Theorem 
2.2A the results of Theorem 2.2B are obtained. 
 
 Proof of Proposition 2.1A. The statement (i) implies (ii) follows from Theorem 2.2A. 
 To prove the converse statement assume that (ii) holds and that L1 and L2 cross at u a= . 
Then the following inequalities hold, 
(A1) ( )
a
1 2
0
L (u) L (u) du 0− >∫   
and 
(A2) ( ) ( )
1
1 2 2 1
0
1
L (u) L (u) du G G 0
2
− = − ≥∫ .  
Since L1 and L2 cross only once (A1) and (A2) imply that 
 ( ) [ ]
u
1 2
0
L (u) L (u) du 0 for all u 0,1− ≥ ∈∫   
and the inequality holds strictly for some u, and the desired result is obtained by applying Theorem 
2.2A. 
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 Proof of Theorem 2.3. Assume that  
(i) [ ]
u u
1 2
0 0
L (t)dt L (t)dt for all u 0,1≥ ∈∫ ∫  
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1∈  and that L1 and L2 intersect m times, where m is an 
arbitrary integer. Since 
1 1
1 2
0 0
L (t)dt L (t)dt=∫ ∫  and L1 and L2 intersect m times, then (i) implies that 
[ ]1 2 1L (u) L (u) for u 0,a≥ ∈  and 1 2L (u) L (u)≤  for [ ]mu a ,1∈  where a1 is the first intersection point 
and am is the last intersection point. Accordingly, m has to be odd. For convenience we let m 2n 1= − , 
where n is an arbitrary integer, and let 
i
a , i 1,2,...,2n 1= −  denote the 2n 1−  u-values where L1 and L2 
intersect, i.e., ( ) ( )1 j 2 jL a L a=  for j 1,2,...,2n 1= − . Thus, we have that 
(A3) 
2 2 j 2 2 j 1
1
2 2 j 1 2 j
L (u) for u a ,a
L (u)
L (u) for u a ,a
− −
−
  ≥ ∈  

 ≤ ∈  
  
for j 1,2,...,n=  where 
1 2 2n 1
0 a a ... a 1
−
< < < < < , 
0
a 0=  and 
2n
a 1= . Furthermore, let L1j and L2j be 
the Lorenz curves defined by 
(A4) 
1 2 j 2 2 j 1
1j
2 2 j 2 2 j 1
L (u) for u 0,a and u a ,1
L (u)
L (u) for u a ,a
− −
− −
    ∈ ∈    
= 
  ∈  
  
and 
(A5) 
1 2 j 1 2 j
2 j
2 2 j 1 2 j
L (u) for u 0,a and u a ,1
L (u)
L (u) for u a ,a
−
−
    ∈ ∈    
= 
  ∈  
  
for j 1,2,...,n= . 
 Then it follows from (A3) that 
 [ ]1j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≤ ∈  
and 
 [ ]2 j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈  
for j 1,2,...,n= . 
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 By applying Theorem 2.1 we get that  
 [ ]1j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≤ ∈  
if and only if L1 can be obtained from L1j by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers, and 
 [ ]2 j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈  
if and only if L1(u) can be obtained from L2j by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton regressive transfers. 
 Next, by noting that 
(A6) ( )
2 n
1 2 1 ij
i 1 j 1
L (u) L (u) L (u) L (u)
= =
− = −∑∑   
we then have that L1 can be obtained from L2 by sequences of Pigou-Dalton progressive and 
regressive transfers. 
 It follows from (A3) that the 2n segments formed by the 2n 1−  intersections may be 
arranged in n pairs where L1(u) dominates L2(u) when 2 j 2 2 j 1u a ,a− − ∈   and L2(u) dominates L1(u) 
when 2 j 1 2 ju a ,a , j 1,2,...,n− ∈ =  . Thus, since 2 j 2 2 j 1 2 ja a a− −< <  it follows for each pair of segments 
that the progressive transfers occur for lower income levels than the regressive transfers. Moreover, 
since 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
1 2 n
1 ij
i 1 j 10
a a
n
1 2 1 2
j 1 a a
1
1 2
0
L (u) L (u) du
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
L (u) L (u) du 0
−
− −
= =
=
− =
 
 − + − =
  
− =
∑∑∫
∑ ∫ ∫
∫
 
we get that 
(A7) ( ) ( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
a a
n n
1 2 2 1
j 1 j 1a a
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
−
− −
= =
− = −∑ ∑∫ ∫ .  
Thus, in order to fulfill the condition of equal Gini coefficients the sequence of Pigou-Dalton 
progressive transfers captured by the left side of equation (A7) has to be matched by a corresponding 
sequence of Pigou-Dalton regressive transfers captured by the right side of equation (A7). 
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Accordingly, we have found that L1 can be obtained from L2 by a downside mean-Gini-preserving 
transformation. 
 
 To prove that (iii) implies (i) we will rely on Theorem 2.2A and follow the line of 
reasoning used by Zoli (1999) for the proof of the “only if part” of his Proposition 3. 
 Consider the family JP defined by (2) for 1P∈P , i.e. for increasing concave P, let F1 and 
F2 be discrete distributions with Lorenz curves L1 and L2, and assume that L1 can be obtained from L2 
by a downside mean-Gini-preserving transformation where N 1= . Thus we consider a Pigou-Dalton 
progressive transfer δ from a person with income 1
2
F (s h)− +  to a person with income 1
2
F (s)−  and a 
Pigou-Dalton regressive transfer γ from a person with income 1
2
F (t)−  to a person with income 
( )12F t h− + % , where s t< . Since these transfers are assumed to leave the Gini coefficient unchanged it 
follows from (3) that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 s 1 s h 1 t 1 t h δ  − − − −  = γ − − − −   
%  
which is equivalent to 
(A8) h hδ = γ% .  
Furthermore, from (2) we have that a downside MGPT reduces inequality, i.e. ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L< , if and 
only if 
(A9) ( ) ( )P (s) P s h P (t) P t h ′ ′ ′ ′δ  − +  > γ − +   
% .  
Inserting for (A8) in (A9) yields 
 
( ) ( )P (t) P t hP (s) P s h
h h
′ ′− +′ ′− +
>
%
%
 
which for small h and h%  is equivalent to 
 P (t) P (s) 0′′ ′′− > . 
Next, inserting for 
1
t s h= + , we find, for small h1, that this inequality is equivalent to P (s) 0′′′ > . Then 
it follows from Theorem 2.2A that L1 second-degree upward dominates L2. 
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 The equivalence between (i) and (ii) follows by noting that 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 2 1
u u
1 u u
2 1 1 2 1 2
0 0 0
1 L (t) 1 L (t) dt L (t) L (t) dt
L (t) L (t) dt L (t) L (t) dt L (t) L (t) dt
 − − −  = − = 
− + − = −
∫ ∫
∫ ∫ ∫
 
when L1 and L2 have equal Gini coefficients. 
 
 To prove that (ii) implies (iv) we follow the line of reasoning used for proving that (i) 
implies (iii). To this end it is convenient to introduce the Lorenz curves 
1i
L%  and 
2i
L%  defined by 
(A10) 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
2 2i 2 2i 1
1i
1 2i 2 2i 1
L (u) for u 0,a and u a ,1
L (u)
L (u) for u a ,a
− −
− −
 ∈ ∈
= 
 ∈
%   
and 
(A11) 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
2 2i 1 2i
2i
1 2i 1 2i
L (u) for u 0,a and u a ,1
L (u)
L (u) for u a ,a
−
−
 ∈ ∈
= 
 ∈
%   
for i 1,2,...,n= . 
 Then it follows from (A3) that  
 [ ]1j 2L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈%  
and 
 [ ]2 j 2L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≤ ∈%  
for j 1,2,...,n= . 
 By applying Theorem 2.1 we thus get that L2 can be obtained from 1jL
%  by a sequence of 
Pigou-Dalton regressive transfers and from 2 jL
%  by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers. 
Moreover, by observing that 
(A12) ( )
2 n
2 1 2 ij
i 1 j 1
L (u) L (u) L (u) L (u)
= =
− = −∑∑ %   
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we thus have that L2 can be obtained from L1 by sequences of Pigou-Dalton regressive and progressive 
transfers. As noted above L2(u) dominates L1(u) when 2 j 1 2 ju a ,a− ∈    and L2(u) is dominated by L1(u) 
when 2 j 2 2 j 1u a ,a , j 1,2,...,n− − ∈ =  . Thus, by arranging the adjacent segments 2 j 2 2 j 1a ,a− −    and 
2 j 1 2 ja ,a−    in n pairs we find for each pair of segments that the regressive transfers occur for lower 
income levels than the progressive transfers. Moreover, since 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
a a1 2 n n
2 ij 2 1 2 1
i 1 j 1 j 10 a a
1
2 1
0
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
L (u) L (u) du 0
−
− −
= = =
 
 − = − + − =
  
− =
∑∑ ∑∫ ∫ ∫
∫
%
 
we get that 
(A13) ( ) ( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
a a
n n
1 2 2 1
j 1 j 1a a
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
−
− −
= =
− = −∑ ∑∫ ∫ .  
Thus, in order to fulfill the condition of equal Gini coefficients the sequence of Pigou-Dalton 
regressive transfers captured by the left side of equation (A13) has to be matched by a corresponding 
sequence of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers captured by the right side of equation (A13). 
 
 To prove that (iv) implies (ii) we consider a Pigou-Dalton regressive transfer δ from a 
person with income 1
1
F (s)−  to a person with income 1
1
F (s h)− +  and a Pigou-Dalton progressive 
transfer γ from a person with income ( )11F t h− + %  to a person with income 11F (t)−  where s t< . Since 
these transfers are assumed to leave the Gini coefficient unchanged it follows that the condition (A8) 
has to be fulfilled. Furthermore, it follows from (2) that an upside MGPT reduces inequality, i.e. 
( ) ( )P 2 P 1J L J L< , if and only if 
 ( ) ( )P (t) P t h P (s) P s h ′ ′ ′ ′γ − + > δ  − +   
%  
which by inserting for the condition (A8) is equivalent to 
 
( ) ( )P (t) P t h P (s) P s h
hh
′ ′− + ′ ′− +
>
%
%
 
which for small h%  and h is equivalent to 
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 P (t) P (s) 0′′ ′′− < . 
Next, inserting for 
1
t s h= + , we find, for small h1, that this inequality is equivalent to P (s) 0′′′ < . Then 
it follows from Theorem 2.2B that L2 second-degree downward dominates L1. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 3.1A. To examine the case of i
th
-degree upward Lorenz dominance we 
integrate ( ) ( )J L J LP P2 1−  by parts i times, 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1i
j 1 ( j) j j i (i 1) i i
P 2 P 1 1 2 1 2
j 2 0
J L J L ( 1) P (1) L (1) L (1) ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du− +
=
− = − − + − −∑ ∫  (A14) 
and use this expression in constructing the proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii). 
 Assume first that (i) in Theorem 3.1A is true, i.e. 
 [ ]i i1 2L (u) L (u) 0 for all u 0,1− ≥ ∈  
and > holds for at least one u 0,1∈ . 
 Then ( ) ( )J L J LP P2 1>  for all 
**
1i
P .∈P  
 Conversely, assume that 
 ( ) ( ) **P 2 P 1 1iJ L J L for all P .> ∈P  
For this family of preference functions we have that 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1
i (i 1) i i
P 2 P 1 1 2
0
J L J L ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du.+− = − −∫  
Then, as demonstrated by Lemma 1, the desired result can be obtained by a suitable choice of **
1i
P∈P .  
 
 Proof of Theorem 3.2A. Assume that (i) in Theorem 3.2A is true, i.e. 
 [ ]i i1 2L (u) L (u) 0 for all u 0,1− ≥ ∈  
and > holds for at least one u 0,1∈ . Then it follows from Theorem 3.1A that ( ) ( )P 2 P 1J L J L>  for 
all 
i1
P∈P  such that ( ) ( )
j j 1
1 P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i
+
− > ∈ =  since this family of P-functions is a 
subfamily of **
1i
P . 
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 Conversely, assume that ( ) ( )P 2 P 1J L J L>  for all 1iP∈P  such that 
( ) ( )
j j 1
1 P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i
+
− > ∈ = . For this family of P-functions we have that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
i i 1 i i
P 2 P 1 1 2
0
J L J L 1 P (u) L (u) L (u) du
+
− = − −∫  
and the desired result is obtained by applying Lemma 1. 
 A proof by mathematical induction will be used to prove the equivalence between (ii) and 
(iii). To this end it is convenient to introduce the following notation. Let H1, H2 and j 1H +  be defined 
by 
(A15) ( ) ( )1 1 1H v,h P (v) P v h′ ′= − + ,  
(A16) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 1 1 1H s, t,h H s,h H t,h= −   
and 
(A17)    ( ) ( ) ( )j 1 1 2 j j 1 2 j 1 j j j 1 2 j 1H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s h , t h ,h ,h ,...,h , j 2,3,...+ − −= − + + = .  
Moreover, let 
(A18) ( ) ( )
1
(1)
2 2 1
h 0
1
1
H s, t lim H s, t,h
h→
=   
and 
(A19) ( ) ( )
j 1
( j)
j 1 j 1 1 2 jjh 0 h 0
k
k 1
1
H s, t lim ... lim H s, t,h ,h ,...,h
h
+ +
→ →
=
=
∏
.  
 It follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2A that JP obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers and the first-degree DPTS iff P (t) 0′′ <  and P (t) 0′′′ > . From (14), definition (2) of JP and 
(A15)-(A19) we then get that JP obeys the second-degree DPTS iff  
(A20) ( )(2)3H s, t 0 for s t> < .  
Inserting for (A17), (A16) and (A15) in (A19) for j 2=  yields 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) }
2 1
2 1
2
2
(2)
3 3 1 2
h 0 h 0
1 2
2 1 2 2 2 1
h 0 h 0
1 2
(1) (1)
2 2 2 2
h 0
2
1 1
h 0
2 1
2 1 2 2 1 2
1
H s, t lim lim H s, t,h ,h
h h
1
lim lim H s, t,h H s h , t h ,h
h h
1
lim H s, t H s h , t h
h
1 1
lim lim P (s) P s h P (t) P t h
h h
P s h P s h h P t h P t h h
lim
→ →
→ →
→
→
= =
− + + =
− + + =
′ ′ ′ ′− + − − + −
 ′ ′ ′ ′+ − + + − + − + + = 
( ) ( )( )
2
(3) (3)
2 2
h 0
P (s) P s h P (t) P t h P (s) P (t).
→
 ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′− + + − − − + = − 
 
Inserting for t s h= + , we find, for small h, that this is equivalent to (4)P (s) 0< . 
 Next, assume that 
(A21) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j 1j 1 ( j) ( j)
jH s, t 1 P (s) P (t)
−
−
= − − .  
It follows from Theorem 2.2A and the proof above that (A21) is true for j equal to 2 and 3. 
 Inserting for (A17) in (A19) we get 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
j 1
j 2
j
( j)
j 1 j 1 2 j 1 j j j 1 2 j 1jh 0 h 0
k
k 1
(1) (1)
j 2 3 j 1 j j 2 3 j 1jh 0 h 0
k
k 2
j 1 j 1
j j j j
h 0
j
1
H s, t 1lim ... lim H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s h , t h ,h ,h ,...,h
h
1
lim ... lim H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s h , t h ,h ,h ,...,h
h
1
lim H s, t H s h , t h ,
h
+ − −
→ →
=
− −
→ →
=
− −
→
= − + + =
− + + =
− + +
∏
∏
 
which by inserting for (A21) yields 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )j j 1 j 1( j)j 1H s, t 1 P (s) P (t)+ ++ = − − . 
Thus, (A21) is proved to be true by induction. 
 Since JP defined by (2) obeys the ( )i 1− th-degree DPTS if and only if 
 
( ) ( )i 1iH s, t 0 for s t
−
> <  
we get from (A21) that this condition is equivalent to 
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 ( ) ( )
i i 1
1 P (s) 0
+
− > . 
 
 Proof of Theorem 3.3A. By inserting for (9) in (A14) we get that 
(A22)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1i
i 1j 1 ( j) i i i
P 2 P 1 j 1 2 j 1 1 1 2
j 2 0
J L J L ( 1) P (1) G L G L ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du
+−
− −
=
− = − − + − −∑ ∫ .  
Assume first that (i) of Theorem 3.3A is true. Then ( ) ( )P 2 P 1J L J L>  for all 
***
1i
P∈P . 
 Conversely, assume that 
 ( ) ( ) ***P 2 P 1 1iJ L J L for all P> ∈P . 
Then this statement holds for the subfamily of ***
1i
P  for which ( j)P (1) 0=  for j 2,3,...,i= . For this 
particular family of preference functions we get that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
i 1i i i
P 2 P 1 1 2
0
J L J L ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du
+
− = − −∫ . 
By applying Lemma 1 we get that L1 i
th
-degree upward dominates L2. 
 Next, consider the subfamily of preference functions defined by 
(A23) ( )
k 1
k
P (t) 1 1 t , k 1,2,...,i 1
+
= − − = − .  
By observing that ***
k 1i
P ∈P  we find by inserting for (A23) in JP that 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
k k
P 2 P 1 k 2 k 1
0 J L J L G L G L< − = −  
for k 1,2,...,i 1= − . 
 
 The proofs of Theorems 3.1B, 3.2B and 3.3B can be constructed by following exactly 
the line of reasoning used in the proofs of Theorems 3.1A and 3.3A. The proofs use the following 
expression, 
(A24) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1i
( j) j j (i 1) i i
P 2 p 1 2 1 2 1
j 2 0
J L J L P (0) L (0) L (0) P (u) L (u) L (u) du ,+
=
− = − − − −∑ ∫% % % %   
which is obtained by using integration by parts i times. 
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 Proof of Theorem 3.4A. 
 To prove the equivalence between (i) and (ii) we draw on the proof of Theorem 3.3A. 
Under the condition of equal Gini coefficients and ( ) ( )j 1 j 2G L G L , j 2,3,...,i= =  we get from (A22) 
that 
(A25) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
i 1 i 2 i 1 i 1
P 2 P 1 1 2
0
J L J L 1 P (u) L (u) L (u) du
+ + + +
− = − −∫ ,  
and the desired result is obtained by applying Lemma 1. 
 
 Next, we will prove that (i) implies (iii). Assume that 
(i) [ ]
u u
i i
1 2
0 0
L (t)dt L (t)dt for all u 0,1≥ ∈∫ ∫  
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1∈  and i
1
L  and i
2
L  intersect m times, where m is an 
arbitrary integer. Since ( ) ( )i 1 i 2G L G L=  is equivalent to 
1 1
i i
1 2
0 0
L (t)dt L (t)dt=∫ ∫  and 
i
1
L  and i
2
L  
intersect m times, then [ ] [ ]i i i i1 2 1 1 2 mL (u) L (u) for u 0,b and L (u) L (u) for u b ,1≥ ∈ ≤ ∈  where b1 is the 
first intersection point and bm is the last intersection point. Accordingly m have to be odd. For 
convenience we let m 2n 1= − , where n is an arbitrary integer, and let 
i
b , i 1,2,...,2n 1= −  denote the 
2n 1−  u-values where i
1
L  and i
2
L  intersect, i.e. ( ) ( )i i1 j 2 jL b L b for j 1,2,...,2n 1= = − . Thus, we have 
that 
(A26) 
i
2 2 j 2 2 j 1i
1 i
2 2 j 1 2 j
L (u) for u b ,b
L (u)
L (u) for u b ,b
− −
−
  ≥ ∈  

 ≤ ∈  
  
for j 1,2,...,n= , where 
1 2 2n 1
0 b b ... b 1
−
< < < < < , 
0
b 0=  and 
2n
b 1= . Furthermore, let i1jL  and 
i
2 jL  be 
the L
i
-curves defined by 
(A27) 
i
1 2 j 2 2 j 1i
1j i
2 2 j 2 2 j 1
L (u) for u 0,b and u b ,1
L (u)
L (u) for u b ,b
− −
− −
    ∈ ∈    
= 
 ∈  
  
and 
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(A28) 
i
1 2 j 1 2 ji
2 j i
2 2 j 1 2 j
L (u) for u 0,b and u b ,1
L (u)
L (u) for u b ,b
−
−
    ∈ ∈    
= 
 ∈  
  
for j 1,2,...,n= . 
 Then it follows from (A26) that 
 [ ]i i1j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≤ ∈  
and 
 [ ]i i2 j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈  
for j 1,2,...,n= . 
 Let us first consider the case where i 2= , i.e. third degree upward Lorenz dominance. By 
applying Theorem 2.3 we have that 
 [ ]2 21j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≤ ∈  
if and only if L1 can be obtained from L1j by a downside mean-Gini-preserving transformation 
(downside MGPT), and 
 [ ]2 22 j 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈  
if and only if 
1
L (u)  can be obtained from L2j by an upside MGPT. 
 Next, by noting that 
(A29) ( )
2 n
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 kj
k 1 j 1
L (u) L (u) L (u) L (u)
= =
− = −∑∑   
we then have that L1 can be obtained from L2 by a combination of a downside and an upside MGPT. It 
follows from (A26) for i 2=  that the 2n segments formed by the 2n 1−  intersections can be arranged 
in n pairs where 
1
L (u)  second-degree upward dominates 
2
L (u)  when 2 j 2 2 j 1u b ,b− − ∈    and 1L (u)  
second-degree downward dominates 
2
L (u)  when 2 j 1 2 ju b ,b− ∈  . Thus, since 2 j 2 2 j 1 2 jb b b− −< <  it 
follows for each pair of segments that the downside MGPT occurs for lower income levels than the 
upside MGPT. Moreover, since 
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( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
1 2 n
2 2
1 kj
k 1 j 10
b b
n
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
j 1 b b
1
2 2
1 2 2 2 2 1
0
L (u) L (u) du
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
L (u) L (u) du G L G L 0
−
− −
= =
=
− =
 
 − + − =
  
− = − =
∑∑∫
∑ ∫ ∫
∫
 
we get that 
(A30) ( ) ( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
b b
n n
2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1
j 1 j 1b b
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
−
− −
= =
− = −∑ ∑∫ ∫ .  
Thus, in oder to fulfill the condition of equal G2-coefficients the sequence of downside MGPTs' 
captured by the left side of equation (A30) has to be matched by a corresponding sequence of upside 
MGPTs' captures by the right side of equation (A30). Accordingly, we have found that L1 can be 
obtained from L2 by a downside MG2PT. 
 By following the line of reasoning used to prove that third-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance implies that the dominating Lorenz curve can be obtained from the dominated Lorenz 
curve by a downside MG2PT we assume that a Lorenz curve L1 that 
th
i -degree upward dominates a 
Lorenz curve L2 can be obtained from L2 by a combination of a downside and an upside i 1MG PT− . 
Then it follows from (A26) that the 2n segments formed by the 2n 1−  intersections of i
1
L  and i
2
L can 
be arranged in n pairs where 
1
L (u)  ith-degree upward dominates 
2
L (u)  when 2 j 2 2 j 1u b ,b− − ∈    and 
1
L (u)  ith-degree downward dominates 
2
L (u)  when 2 j 1 2 ju b ,b− ∈  . Thus, since 2 j 2 2 j 1 2 jb b b− −< <  it 
follows for each pair of segments that the downside 
i 1
MG PT
−
 occurs for lower income levels than the 
upside 
i 1
MG PT
−
. Moreover, since 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
1 2 n
i i
1 kj
k 1 j 10
b b
n
i i i i
1 2 1 2
j 1 b b
1
i i
1 2 i 2 i 1
0
L (u) L (u) du
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
L (u) L (u) du G L G L 0
−
− −
= =
=
− =
 
 − + − =
  
− = − =
∑∑∫
∑ ∫ ∫
∫
 
we get that 
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(A31) ( ) ( )
2 j 1 2 j
2 j 2 2 j 1
b b
n n
i i i i
1 2 2 1
j 1 j 1b b
L (u) L (u) du L (u) L (u) du
−
− −
= =
− = −∑ ∑∫ ∫ .  
Thus, in order to fulfill the condition of equal Gi-coefficients the sequence of downside i 1MG PTs− ′  
captured by the left side of equation (A31) has to be matched by a corresponding sequence of upside 
i 1
MG PTs
−
′  captured by the right side of equation (A31). Accordingly, we have found that L1 can be 
obtained from L2 by a downside iMG PT . 
 
 A proof by mathematical induction will be used to prove that (iii) implies (i). To this end 
it is convenient to introduce the following notation. 
 Let 
(A32) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
kk k k
2 j j j j j j j jA j,k 1 s 1 s h 1 t 1 t h= δ − − − − − γ − − − −
% ,  
(A33) ( ) ( ) ( )i i 1 i 1A j,k A j,k 1 A j a(i),k 1− −= + − + + ,  
(A34) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )P j j j j j j j jT 2, j P s P s h P t P t h′ ′ ′ ′= δ − + − γ − + %   
and 
(A35) ( ) ( ) ( )( )P P PT i 1, j T i, j T i, j a i 1+ = − + +   
where 
(A36) i 3a(i) 2 , i 3,4,...−= = .  
 Consider the family JP defined by (2) where F1 and F2 are discrete distributions with 
Lorenz curves L1 and L2, and assume that L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of downside 
MGiPTs´. Thus, we consider pairs ( )j j,δ γ  of Pigou-Dalton progressive/regressive transfers δj from a 
person with income ( )12 j jF s h− +  to a person with income ( )12 jF s−  and γj from a person with 
income ( )12 jF t−  to a person with income ( )12 j jF t h− + % , where j js t< , j j 1s s +<  and j j 1t t +< . Since the 
transfers are assumed to leave the Gini coefficient unchanged it follows from (3) that 
 ( )2A j,1 0= , 
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which from (A32) is found to be equivalent to 
(A37) j j j jh hδ = γ
% .  
The condition of fixed G2-coefficients is equivalent to the following requirement 
 ( ) ( ) ( )3 2 2A j,1 A j,2 A j 1,2 0= − + = , 
which by inserting for (A37) is equivalent to 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
222 2
j j jj j j
j j
j j
222 2
j 1 j 1 j 1j 1 j 1 j 1
j 1 j 1
j 1 j 1
1 t 1 t h1 s 1 s h
h
h h
1 t 1 t h1 s 1 s h
h
h h
+ + ++ + +
+ +
+ +
 − − − −− − − − δ − =
  
 
 − − − −− − − − δ −
  
 
%
%
%
%
 
which for small j j j 1 j 1h , h , h and h+ +
% %  is found to be equivalent to 
(A38) ( ) ( )j j j j j 1 j 1 j 1 j 1h t s h t s+ + + +δ − = δ − .  
By proceeding for i 4=  we get that the condition of fixed G3-coefficients is equal to the requirement 
 ( ) ( ) ( )4 3 3A j,1 A j,2 A j 2,2 0= − + = , 
which by inserting for (A37) and (A38) (for small j j j 1 j 1 j 2 j 2 j 3 j 3h , h , h , h , h , h , h and h+ + + + + +
% % % % ) is 
equivalent to 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
j j j 1 j 1
j j j j
j j j 1 j 1
2 2 2 2
j 2 j 2 j 3 j 3
j 2 j 2 j 2 j 2
j 2 j 2 j 3 j 3
1 s 1 t 1 s 1 t
h t s
t s t s
1 s 1 t 1 s 1 t
h t s ,
t s t s
+ +
+ +
+ + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
 − − − − − −
 δ − − =
 − −
 
 − − − − − −
 δ − −
 − −
 
 
which for small j t j tt s+ +−  for t 0,1,2,3=  is found to be equivalent to 
 ( )( ) ( )( )j j j j j 1 j j 2 j 2 j 2 j 2 j 3 j 2h t s s s h t s s s+ + + + + + +δ − − = δ − − . 
Similarly, the condition of unchanged Gi-coefficients is captured by the requirement 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )( )i 1 i iA j,1 A j,2 A j a i 1 ,2 0+ = − + + = , 
which by inserting for the conditions of equal Gj-coefficients, j 1,2,...,i 1= −  for small j t j t 1s s+ + −−  is 
found to be equivalent to 
(A39) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
i 2 i 2
j j j j j t j j a i 1 j a i 1 j a i 1 j a i 1 j a i 1 t j a i 1
t 1 t 1
h t s s s h t s s s
− −
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + +
= =
δ − − = δ − −∏ ∏ .  
 The case for i 1=  (second-degree Lorenz dominance) was proved for Theorem 2.3. Thus, 
let us firstly consider the case i 2= . Inserting for (A37) in ( )PT 3,1  defined by (A35) we find that a 
downside MG2PT reduces inequality, i.e. ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L< , if and only if 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )P 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2T 3,1 h P s P t h P s P t 0′′ ′′ ′′ ′′= δ − + − δ − − > , 
which by inserting for (A38) is equivalent to 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
P t P s P t P s
t s t s
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′− −
>
− −
, 
which for small 
1 1
t s−  and 
2 2
t s−  is equivalent to 
 ( ) ( )2 1P s P s 0′′′ ′′′− < , 
which for small 
2 1
s s−  is equivalent to 
 ( )(4) 1P s 0< . 
 Next, we have that a downside MGiPT reduces inequality if and only if 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )P P PT i 1,1 T i,1 T i,a i 1 1 0+ = − + + > , 
which by inserting for (A37) in ( )PT 2,1 , (A38) in ( )PT 3,1  and so forth is found to be equivalent to 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
i 3
i (i) (i)
1 1 1 1 t 1 1 i 1 1
t 1
a i 1 1 a i 1 1 a i 1 1 a i 1 1
i 3
i (i) (i)
a i 1 1 t a i 1 1 a i 1 i 1 a i 1 1
t 1
h t s s s 1 P s P s
h t s
s s 1 P s P s
−
+ −
=
+ + + + + + + +
−
+ + + + + + + − + +
=
 δ − − − − >
 
δ − ⋅
 − − −  
∏
∏
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which by inserting for (A39) is equivalent to 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
(i) (i)(i) (i)i 2
a i 1 i 1 a i 1 1i i 1 1
1 1 1 1 t 1 1
t 1 i 1 1 a i 1 i 1 a i 1 1
P s P sP s P s
h t s s s 1 0
s s s s
−
+ + − + +
−
+
= − + + − + +
  −−  δ − − − − >
  − −
   
∏ , 
which for small 
i 2 1
s s
−
−  and ( ) ( )a i 1 i 1 a i 1 1s s+ + − + +−  is equivalent to 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
i 2
(i) i 1 i 1
1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 a i 1 1
t 1
h t s s s 1 P s P s 0
−
+ +
+ + +
=
 δ − − − − >  ∏
 
which for small ( ) 1a i 1 1s s+ + −  is equivalent to  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
i 1 i 2
1
1 P s 0
+ +
− > . 
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